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Hijab Martyrdom, Headscarf Debates: 
Rethinking Violence, Secularism,  
and Islam in Germany
Beverly M. Weber
he ongoing and contentious debates on the presence of the hijab in public space in 
Europe present a particular challenge to critical theory and its impulse to critique. 
Discourses surrounding forms of Islamic head covering exist at a complex intersec-
tion of notions of democracy, freedom, secularism — and of critique itself, which historically 
has been attached to a particular understanding of secularism. In the case of Germany, nego-
tiations concerning the figure of the Muslim woman in relationship to secularism, democracy, 
violence, and public space play an important, yet ambivalent, role in a national narrative, one 
which imagines a Germany that has successfully emerged from the shadow of the Shoah to 
embrace a democratic identity. The ambiguities inherent in such a narrative are revealed in 
the contrasting response to two women who both emerged in the public eye based on their 
wearing of the headscarf yet are rarely discussed in relationship to each other. In this article 
I consider the popular representations of Germany’s so- called headscarf debate, in which 
Fereshta Ludin sought placement as a public school teacher, and of the murder of Marwa 
el- Sherbini, who was dubbed the “hijab martyr” after her death in a German courtroom at 
the hands of a xenophobic man with ethnic German heritage. The juxtaposition of these two 
figures reveals the diculty of and need for a critique of headscarf discourses. In the case of 
Ludin, the portrayal of the German state as the patronizing protector of the Muslim woman 
serves to legitimate the exclusion of those of immigrant heritage from participation in the 
public sphere. Similarly, the emphasis on the failure of the German state to protect el- Sherbini 
from an armed man in the courtroom functions to distract from an examination of racism in 
contemporary Germany. A critique of headscarf discourses thus reveals the need to theorize 
anew the relationship among modernity, religious dierence, secularism, and violence. Such 
a theorization must address the role of racism in German democracy, construct new relation-
ships between religious/communal attachment and notions of the public/private, and provide 
new understandings of secularism and its relationship to a nonviolent future.
Secularism, Post- secularism, Europe
The diculty of a critique of the discourse of the veil lies at least partly in the history of the 
European tradition of critique itself. As Wendy Brown has recently reminded us, the notion 
of critique that eventually gave birth to the body of theory we today call critical theory is 
rooted in the Enlightenment assumption that religious perspectives must be shed in order to 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
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enable rational critique, understood as an ap-
prehension of the conditions of possibility for 
any particular phenomenon.1 The legacy of this 
thought leads to Karl Marx’s distinction between 
critique and criticism, in which criticism merely 
evaluates or judges religion, while critique is 
able to apprehend the social and economic 
conditions that require religious illusion.2 How, 
then, to formulate a critique of the discourse 
of religion that draws on the insights of critical 
theory? This can function only to the extent 
to which critical theory can be turned against 
itself: it requires critique of the foundations of 
critique, in particular, the presumed necessary 
relationship between a form of secularism that 
relegates religion to the private and an eec-
tive, inclusive democracy. While the structure 
of such a move is certainly not contrary to the 
spirit of critical theory, it has proven dicult to 
enact in relationship to religion.
Consider, for example, the notion of 
the public sphere — more specifically, the role 
that the wearing of Islamic head coverings has 
played in excluding Muslim women from active 
participation in the European public sphere. 
Jürgen Habermas’s early elaborations of the 
public sphere see it as an emancipatory space 
that emerges from rational deliberation on 
common issues, ideally resulting in polices that 
will serve the common good. An eective pub-
lic sphere must remain inclusive and guarantee 
access to all citizens but, to do so, transcends 
and brackets out dierence in order to seek the 
common good.3 Even today, many cultural crit-
ics of forms of racism in Germany replicate this 
assumption that dierence can be “productive” 
only in the private sphere.4 A number of chal-
lenges to Habermas’s early theories of the pub-
lic sphere quickly emerged. For example, a large 
body of feminist research argues that in brack-
eting out dierence (or relocating dierence to 
the private sphere), the public sphere in eect 
works against the common good by excluding 
women.5 The early modern public sphere actu-
ally functioned to enable the concerns of mid-
dle- and upper- class European men to be repre-
sented as universal; the public sphere continues 
to exclude those produced as others within any 
given society. Chantal Moue has further ar-
gued that the notion of the public sphere may 
go so far as to eliminate not only dierence but 
all public dissent.6 The most radical critiques 
seek not to amend a normative public sphere to 
be more inclusive but to suggest that the public 
sphere actually produces dominance and power. 
“Dierence” does not exist outside the public 
sphere but is produced by it;7 the expulsion of 
that viewed as other by necessity privileges the 
dominant groups, who serve as the norm against 
which dierence is defined. Indeed, the public 
sphere, by seeking to exclude certain forms of 
dierence, produces marked bodies in opposi-
tion to an abstracted, disembodied subject of 
the public sphere.8
Moue has further argued for consider-
ing difference as fundamental to the proper 
functioning of the public sphere. She suggests 
that the desire for reconciliation, or for elimina-
tion of dierence, that haunts many liberal con-
ceptions of the public sphere prevents eective 
public debate.9 This dilemma derives in part 
from the tendency to conflate the separations 
between church and state, religion and politics, 
and public and private, and in part from the 
conflation of politics with state politics. If what is 
truly at stake is the separation between religion 
and state power, there is no reason to prohibit 
religious groups or individuals from interven-
1. See Wendy Brown, introduction to Is Critique Secu-
lar? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, by Talal Asad, 
Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood, 
Townsend Papers in the Humanities 2 (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2009), 11.
2. See ibid., 12.
3.  See Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An En-
cyclopedia Article (1964),” New German Critique 3 
(1974): 49.
4. See, e.g., Mark Terkessidis, “Wir selbst sind die An-
deren: Globalisierung, multikulturelle Gesellschaft 
und Neorassismus” (“We Are the Others: Globali-
zation, Multicultural Society and Neoracism”), in 
Zuwanderung im Zeichen der Globalisierung: Migra-
tions- , Integrations- und Minderheitenpolitik (Immi-
gration under the Sign of Globalization: Migration, 
Integration, and Minority Politics), ed. Christoph But-
terwege and Gudrun Hentges (Opladen, Germany: 
Leske and Budrich, 2000), 204.
5.  See Iris Marion Young, “Impartiality and the Civic 
Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of 
Moral and Political Theory,” Praxis International 4 
(1985): 381 – 401; and Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the 
Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Ac-
tually Existing Democracy,” Social Text, no. 25 (1990): 
56 – 80.
6. See Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (New 
York: Verso, 2000), 30.
7.  See Alev Çınar, “Subversion and Subjugation in 
the Public Sphere: Secularism and the Islamic Head-
scarf,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 
33 (2008): 892 – 93.
8.  See ibid. See also Lauren Berlant, The Queen of 
America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and 
Citizenship  (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1997).
9. See Chantal Mouffe, “Religion, Liberal Democracy, 
and Citizenship,” in Political Theologies: Public Reli-
gions in a Post- secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and 
Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2006), 320.
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tion in the larger political arena.10 The problem 
rather emerges when certain religious commu-
nities, or members or symbols of those commu-
nities, are allowed to appear in public space, 
while others are not. Recent laws in several Ger-
man provinces that ban Islamic symbols from 
classrooms, particularly the headscarf, while 
permitting Judeo- Christian symbols provide an 
excellent example. While ostensibly protecting 
the secular space of the school, Christian and 
Jewish groups and symbols have been privileged 
in the name of secularism.
Habermas himself has reconsidered how 
to think dierence in relationship to secular-
ism and the public sphere, but with a particu-
lar focus on religious language. He recently 
engaged in a series of conversations with the 
intention of articulating the possibility for re-
thinking the notion of politics in what he (with 
ambivalence) has called a “post- secular” Eu-
rope. Habermas’s remarks have been particu-
larly surprising in their willingness to articulate 
a place for religious language in public political 
discussions. Here I would like to highlight a few 
points from his essay “Notes on a Post- secular 
Society.” 
In his essay Habermas repeats the tradi-
tional narrative of secularism in Europe as a 
path to peace after the confessional wars. His-
torically, secularism was thought to provide 
a strategy for ending the violence of religious 
conflict by managing the relationship between 
religion and the public (particularly the state) 
by relegating religion specifically to the private. 
While Habermas wishes to consider whether Eu-
rope has moved into a postsecular age, the use 
of the term post is deceiving, for in his under-
standing, “post- secularism” is an age in which 
one must “adjust” to the “continuing existence” 
of religious communities.11 As a consequence, 
Habermas now argues that religious language, 
at least, must be permitted in the public sphere. 
Public disputes over religion can provide a space 
in which subjects of democracy may emerge — 
in finding common political ground, the indi-
vidual cultural identities can be maintained 
even as people see themselves as participants in 
a common political community.12
This intervention complicates the under-
standings of the public sphere in order to re-
dress the potential for exclusion on grounds 
of religious affiliation. If we define language 
broadly, we could conclude that Habermas’s 
argument suggests that the headscarf, as a sym-
bol of Islam, should be allowed in public space. 
However, Habermas falls short of providing a 
conceptual framework for addressing the fixa-
tion on forms of Islamic head covering, one that 
produces the Muslim woman’s body as hypervis-
ible in Western societies while excluding Muslim 
women from public sphere participation. This 
fixation partially rests on the assumption of the 
inherent violence of Islam. In the debates about 
the role of Islam in Germany, the incommen-
surability of Islam with the ideals of European 
modernity are often fundamentally related to 
controversies about human rights, particularly 
rights to bodily integrity and gender equality. 
Yet Habermas, who has championed Germany 
as part of the “avantgardist core” of Europe 
to be at the forefront of a Europe committed 
to human rights, seems unable to address the 
controversies about women’s rights and violence 
against women that have been such an impor-
tant part of the debates on integration, Islam, 
and Europe.13 His focus on defining the extent 
of secularism by the numbers of people par-
ticipating in religious communities also is un-
able to engage with the aspects of the state that 
institutionalize forms of Christianity in many 
Western European countries — via management 
of religious education, for example. His focus 
on identity (in terms of cultural dierence) in-
stead of embodied practices (like the wearing 
of the headscarf ) further limits his discussion 
of secularism.
These omissions in Habermas’s consider-
ations of the possibilities for a postsecular Eu-
rope have been at least partially addressed in an-
other context. Anthropologist Talal Asad, who 
10. See ibid., 325.
11.  Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on a Post- secular Soci-
ety,” signandsight.com, 18 June 2008, www.signand 
sight.com/features/1714.html.
12. See ibid.
13.  Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “Febru-
ary 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a 
Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe,” 
in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic 
Relations after the Iraq War, ed. Daniel Levy, Max Pen-
sky, and John Torpey (New York: Verso, 2005), 3 – 13.
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seeks to write an “anthropology of the secular” 
in Europe, has elaborated on the epistemologi-
cal assumptions of the secular, with a particu-
lar interest in pain and torture as mechanisms 
by which the secular human becomes a human 
subject during the Enlightenment.14 While he 
addresses a radically dierent context than I do, 
he makes some intriguing assertions about vio-
lence and secularism that are useful in consid-
ering the role that veils and headscarves play in 
discussions of secular and postsecular Europe. 
While dominant narratives of the Enlight-
enment see secularism as an important means 
to peace via tolerance, Asad suggests that “a sec-
ular state does not guarantee toleration; it puts 
into play dierent structures of ambition and 
fear. The law never seeks to eliminate violence 
since its object is always to regulate violence” (8). 
Thus violence is regulated by the state in part 
by the regulation of dierence through struc-
tures of “toleration.” Membership in or exclu-
sion from the state is inextricably linked to the 
regulation of dierence: “Secularism is not sim-
ply an intellectual answer to a question about 
enduring social peace and toleration. It is an 
enactment by which a political medium (represen-
tation of citizenship) redefines and transcends 
particular and dierentiating practices of the 
self that are articulated through class, gender, 
and religion” (5). Influenced by postcolonial 
theory, Asad writes a narrative of European his-
tory in which the violence of Europe’s religious 
wars is not eliminated by secularism but rather 
transformed into the violence of national and 
colonial wars. Thus secularism has been not a 
path to peace but rather a means of displacing 
violence. Asad sees a continuing secular vio-
lence that has colonialism as its heritage, a “vio-
lence lying at the heart of a political doctrine 
that has disavowed violence on principle.” We 
might call this continued violence a symbolic 
and epistemic violence that enables forms of ra-
cialized violence. This requires the cultivation 
of an other, a “dark jungle” against which the 
Enlightenment can be defined (59).
Bringing these two very dierent scholars 
into dialogue suggests that a European secular-
ism as the management of public and private 
spheres in order to end religious violence is 
actually founded on the epistemic violence of 
constructing an other, one that legitimates the 
actions of the nation- state through the regula-
tion — but not prohibition — of violence. The 
complex interactions of these aspects of secu-
larism today produce a very limited space in 
which Muslim women can participate in the 
public sphere. The construction of the other oc-
curs in part through the attention to violence 
against Muslim women and the endless dis-
cussions about headscarves — both constantly 
represented as “new, invisible” crises that are 
inextricably linked to each other. Strategies 
presented against gender violence, however, 
can also serve to prevent Muslim women from 
participating in the political sphere. A very obvi-
ous example of this is the federal working group 
on Islam and Germany referred to as the Islam-
 Konferenz, in which many of the women chosen 
to represent the Muslim community are women 
who have rejected Islam as inherently antitheti-
cal to European modernity. This decision rests 
on the assumption that the headscarf signals 
a form of gender violence. In a complex series 
of slippages, a threatened political violence is 
then seen to be indicated by domestic violence, 
visually signaled by the headscarf. The figure 
of the covered woman participating in German 
citizenship defines and troubles a boundary be-
tween public and private, religious and secular; 
her exclusion from the Islam- Konferenz man-
ages that boundary confusion. In this way a 
certain form of secularism, while advocated as 
a path to the end of gender violence, ultimately 
excludes Muslim women from participation in 
the public sphere. 
Contextualizing the Headscarf  
in the German Context
A visual imagination of the veiled or covered 
Muslim woman has long played a role in Ger-
man thought, art, and literature. I discuss a 
much longer historical trajectory elsewhere; 
here I confine my discussion to the role played 
by the figure of the Muslim woman in the con-
14. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 24.
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text of Germany’s postwar labor migration.15 
Beginning in the 1950s, Germany signed guest-
worker contracts with a number of countries; 
Turkey became the largest “sending” country 
after the building of the Berlin Wall cut o im-
migration from East Germany.16 Today, some 
4 million residents of Germany are Muslim. 
Owing to Germany’s traditionally restrictive 
citizenship laws, only 45 percent of Muslim resi-
dents in Germany have German citizenship.17 
While Muslims from southeast Europe now 
outnumber Turkish Muslims in Germany, dis-
cussions in Germany are heavily influenced by 
the history of Turkish migration, as well as the 
traditions of Turkish secularism.18
The figure of the covered immigrant 
woman capturing the imagination of the Ger-
man public and dominating discussions of im-
migration in Germany over the previous de-
cades has evolved significantly. The cleaning 
woman, the Kopftuchfrau (headscarf woman), 
of the 1970s and 1980s was a figure both less 
threatening and less present in the popular 
imagination. This representation focused on 
national, class, and educational dierence to 
locate immigrant culture in a rural, traditional, 
distant past. This figure occasionally alternated 
with the exoticized body of a belly dancer, or a 
woman in a niqab, but dominant representations 
located dierence in class and education.19
Gradually, however, and in particular 
after unification, representations of immigrant 
women in Germany shifted to emphasize cul-
tural difference — in particular, cultural dif-
ference located in Islam. The 1997 cover from 
the respected weekly news magazine Der Spiegel 
marks this transition — the dierence located 
in a nation remains at the forefront, but in the 
background sit the quiet Kopftuchmädchen (head-
scarf girls), who are emerging as a dominant 
image of Islam. They are accompanied by their 
dangerous, criminal brothers, whose violence is 
represented in their stance, facial expression, 
and the weapons they carry. 
This shift to an emphasis on cultural dier-
ence, expressed as religious dierence, came to 
a head in 1997 when Fereshta Ludin, a German 
citizen in the province of Baden- Württemberg, 
sought placement as a public school teacher 
while wearing a hijab. The right- wing party Re-
publikaner challenged her placement in a par-
liamentary debate, initiating a widely covered 
headscarf debate, referred to in German as the 
Kopftuchstreit. During this debate the hijab was 
alternately seen as a threat to German secular-
ism, Christian culture, feminist progress, En-
lightenment, and European values. 
The forbidden schoolteacher revealed 
fears as the immigrant woman became upwardly 
mobile and began to emerge as a German and 
European subject — one who has access to eco-
nomic, political, and cultural citizenship, and 
one who, as teacher, would play a key role in the 
reproduction of notions of citizenship. 
Representations of the murder of Marwa 
el- Sherbini in this trajectory are revealing in 
terms of the possibilities for cultural, political, 
and economic citizenship aorded to Muslim 
women. In July 2009, el- Sherbini, an Egyptian 
citizen, was killed in a courtroom after bring-
15.  See Beverly M. Weber, “Cloth on Her Head, Con-
stitution in Hand: Germany’s Headscarf Debates 
and the Cultural Politics of Difference,” German 
Politics and Society 22, no. 3 (2004): 33 – 63. An ex-
cellent examination of the construction of the Ori-
ental woman in the context of colonial fantasies 
is Meyda Yeğenoğlu, Colonial Fantasies: Towards a 
Feminist Reading of Orientalism (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998). Several scholars have 
examined aspects of the role of the image of the 
veiled woman in constructing a racialized or “ethnic” 
other in contemporary German culture, including 
Manuela Westphal, “Arbeitsmigrantinnen im Spie-
gel westdeutscher Frauenbilder” (“Worker Migrants 
as Reflected in West German Images of Women”), 
Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis 19, no. 
42 (1996): 17 – 28; Mark Terkessidis, “Globale Kultur 
in Deutschland oder: Wie unterdrückte Frauen und 
Kriminelle die Hybridität retten” (“Global Culture in 
Germany, or How Oppressed Women and Criminals 
Are Rescuing Hybridity”), in Kultur- Medien- Macht: 
Cultural Studies und Medienanalyse (Culture- Media-
Power: Cultural Studies and Media Analysis), ed. An-
dreas Hepp and Rainer Winter (Wiesdaden: VS Ver-
lag für Sozialwissenaften, 1999), 2:237 – 52; Helma 
Lutz, “Unsichtbare Schatten? Die ‘orientalische’ Frau 
in westlichen  Diskursen — Zur Konzeptualisierung 
einer Opferﬁgur” (“Invisible Shadows? The ‘Oriental’ 
Woman in West ern Discourses — Toward a Concep-
tualization of a Victim Figure”), Peripherie 37 (1989): 
51 – 65; and Christine Huth- Hildebrandt, Das Bild von 
der Migrantin: Auf den Spuren eines Konstrukts (The 
Image of the Migrant Woman: Tracking a Construct) 
(Frankfurt:  Brandes and Apsel, 2002). Verschleierte 
Wirklichkeit also provides a comparative perspective 
of representation of women in Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity as well as the construction of the Mus-
lim woman by the West. See Christina Von Braun and 
Bettina Mathes, Verschleierte Wirklichkeit: Die Frau, 
der Islam und der Westen (Veiled Reality: Woman, 
Islam, and the West) (Berlin: Aufbau- Verlag, 2007).
16.  An excellent discussion of early discourses at 
work in conjunction with worker migration is Rita 
Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
17. See Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig, and Anja Stichs,
Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland im Auftrag der 
Deutschen Islam Konferenz: Forschungsbericht 6 (Mus-
lim Life in Germany, Commissioned by the German 
Islam- Conference: Research Report 6) (Nuremberg: 
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009).
18. See ibid.
19. See Irmgard Pinn and Marlies Wehner, EuroPhan-
tasien: Die islamische Frau aus westlicher Sicht (Euro-
Fantasies: The Muslim Woman from a Western Per-
spective) (Duisburg, Germany: Duisburger Institut 
für Sprach- und Sozialforschung, 1995), 39; Huth-
 Hildebrandt, Das Bild, 46; and Westphal, “Arbeitsmi-
grantinnen im Spiegel westdeutscher Frauenbilder.”
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ing charges against Alex Wiens. Wiens, a sym-
pathizer of the right- wing National Democratic 
Party (NPD), had called her an Islamist and 
terrorist at a playground when she asked him 
to allow her son to use a swing. At the time of 
her murder, el- Sherbini had just completed her 
testimony against Wiens, who had appealed his 
fine for insulting speech. While the murder 
quickly gained attention in Egypt (el- Sherbini’s 
home country) and Iran, seen as an example of 
growing European Islamophobia, the German 
press did not react to the case for nearly a week. 
By the time German ocials and the media did 
respond, el- Sherbini was being referred to as 
a “hijab martyr” in the Islamic world, and her 
death acknowledged as the first Islamopho-
bic murder in Germany. Yet discussions of her 
case relocated violence outside of Europe, to 
the anti- European sentiment of the so- called 
Muslim world. The reduction of her case to an 
example of martyrdom abroad and to a woman 
insuciently protected by the German state in 
German coverage both exclude her from par-
ticipation in democratic public spheres.
Read together, the discourses surround-
ing the cases of Ludin and el- Sherbini reveal 
some interesting points about the contemporary 
German debates on integration. Neither one in-
volves a Turkish German, yet both are used to ex-
amine the experience of the Turkish immigrant 
population as Germans. In one, a German citi-
zen claims her rights to religious freedom under 
the German constitution in order to be allowed 
to teach wearing the headscarf. El- Sherbini, an 
Egyptian citizen, claimed her rights under Ger-
man law and the constitution to testify against 
Wiens for Beleidigung aus Fremdenhass (xenopho-
bically motivated slander). While the headscarf 
played a marginal role in el- Sherbini’s case, she 
became known as the headscarf martyr.
Reading these two cases together dem-
onstrates the difficulty of engaging intersec-
tional dierences in the German public sphere. 
As Susan B. Rottmann and Myra Marx Ferree 
point out, public discussions have been largely 
unable to include a focus on race. Not only is 
this focus absent in terms of its intersection with 
gender and other forms of dierence, but even 
in terms of the importance of antiracism in Eu-
ropean values, or in terms of European Union 
(EU) policies. Court cases about whether public 
school teachers can wear headscarves to work 
dominate public discourse, while debates about 
German compliance with the EU antidiscrimi-
nation laws are largely avoided.20 While Ludin’s 
headscarf was viewed as indicative of the wide-
 ranging violent impacts of a growing Islamism, 
el- Sherbini’s death, once it finally appeared in 
the press, it was viewed as an isolated instance. 
Despite a recent spike in incidents in racist vio-
lence, journalists, politicians, and even repre-
sentatives of Muslim organizations took pains to 
emphasize that the murder of el- Sherbini was 
not evidence of extensive institutionalized rac-
ism or Islamophobia.
Fereshta Ludin and the Headscarf Debates
Germany’s incarnation of headscarf debates 
chronologically roughly parallels the emergence 
of France’s second “aair of the veil.” 21 In 1997 
Ludin had completed preparation for a career as 
a teacher and was ready to be placed in a student-
 teaching position. The Republikaner, which at 
that time had seats in the Baden- Württemberg 
parliament, initiated a parliamentary debate 
in which the party argued that the Baden-
 Württemberg constitution must be honored, in 
which it states that “youth are to be raised in the 
fear of God [ . . . ] Children will be raised on the 
basis of Christian and Western educational and 
cultural values.” 22
Because of the state’s monopoly on teacher 
training and education, Ludin was placed as a 
student teacher in a public school.23 Ludin suc-
20. See Susan B. Rottmann and Myra Marx Ferree,
“Citizenship and Intersectionality: German Feminist
Debates about Headscarf and Antidiscrimination
Laws,” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, 
State and Society 15 (2008): 481–513.
21. For a discussion of the French headscarf debates
in the context of racist and colonial discourses, see
JoanWallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). On the exten-
sive discussion of the French headscarf debates, see
Jane Freedman, “Secularism as a Barrier to Integra-
tion? The French Dilemma,” International Migra-
tion 43, no. 3 (2004): 5 – 28; Christian Joppke, “State 
Neutrality and Islamic Headscarf Laws in France and
Germany,” Theory and Society 36 (2007): 313–42; and
Bronwyn Winter, “Secularism aboard the Titanic:
Feminists and the Debate over the Hijab in France,” 
Feminist Studies 32 (2006): 279–98.
22. Landtag von Baden-Württemberg, Plenarproto-
koll 12/23, 20.03.97, 20 March 1997, 1632.
23. See Annette Schavan, Antrag der Abg. Helmut 
Rau u. a. CDU und Stellungnahme des Ministeriums 
für Kultus, Jugend und Sport Islamische Lehrkraft im 
Vorbereitungsdienst –Islamischer Religionsunterricht 
in deutscher Sprache (Application of Representative 
Helmut Rau et al., CDU and Position Statement of the 
Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport. Islamic Teacher 
in Training—Islamic Religious Instruction in the Ger-
man Language), 29 April 1997; and Thorsten Schmitz,
Kein Stoff für die Schule: Der Fall Ludin; Wer steckt 
unter dem Tuch? (No Cloth for School: The Case of 
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cessfully completed her two years as a student 
teacher and received good grades and positive 
feedback. No parental complaints were lodged 
against her.24 However, after completing her 
student teaching, she was prevented from place-
ment as a public school teacher. Then minis-
ter of culture Annette Schavan reasoned that 
as the wearing of the headscarf is controver-
sial and not clearly required by the Koran, its 
wearing must be an inherently political symbol, 
yet one that infringes on a student’s freedom 
from religious participation (negative religious 
freedom).25 One must note here that the wear-
ing of a Christian clerical collar or nun’s habit 
by public school teachers had not been ques-
tioned in these discussions.
Ludin then sued for the right to a teach-
ing position. She argued that her headscarf 
was a personal decision, an article of clothing 
worn for religious reasons but without a desire 
to missionize for Islam. The lower courts found 
against Ludin, citing state neutrality, Ludin’s in-
ability to fulfill her duties as a civil servant, and 
the “visibility” and “demonstrative character” of 
the headscarf, regardless of Ludin’s intentions.26 
The conflict between Ludin’s freedom of reli-
gion and Baden- Württemberg’s rootedness in 
Christian values, said the court, must necessar-
ily be resolved to Ludin’s disadvantage in order 
to arm Christianity’s place in the provincial 
constitution, which is one of relationship “only 
to cultural and educational influence, not to 
specific religious realities.” 27 In September 2003 
the Federal Constitutional Court decided for 
Ludin (five to three), but on the basis of a lack 
of existing laws in the Bundesländer (individual 
provinces) regulating the relationship between 
church and state in the classroom.28 In other 
words, this decision essentially emphasized that 
questions regarding education are the purview 
of provincial, not federal, law. The decision im-
plies that a nondiscriminatory law that treats all 
religions equally and bans the headscarf could 
be constitutional: any such law would have to 
adhere to “strict equality in the handling of dif-
ferent religious beliefs, both in the justification 
as well as in the enforcement of such employ-
ment duties.” 29
In the wake of this decision, eight of 
Germany’s sixteen provinces passed headscarf 
bans.30 Note, however, that many headscarf 
bans have explicitly banned Islamic symbols 
and permitted Christian symbols, while others 
are implicitly interpreted to permit Christian 
and Judaic symbols. The Baden- Württemberg 
law, for example, reads:
Teachers in public schools . . . may not exter-
nally represent political, religious, worldview, 
or other similar positions that would potentially 
endanger the neutrality of the province vis- a- vis 
students and parents [ . . . ] In particular, exter-
nal behavior that would evoke the impression by 
students or parents that the teacher is against 
human dignity, the equal rights of people ac-
cording to Article 3 of the Basic Law, the basic 
freedoms, or the liberal democratic order, is 
not permissible. [ . . . ] Symbols of Christian and 
Western educational and cultural values or tra-
ditions do not infringe on this ban.31
Berlin is the only province to pass a law explic-
itly banning all religious symbols in the class-
room.32 Ludin challenged the constitutionality 
of the Baden- Württemberg law but lost before 
the Federal Administrative Court in June 2004. 
Ludin, Who Is Hiding under the Scarf?), Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 23 July 1998.
24. See Schmitz, Kein Stoff für die Schule.
25.  See Ministerium für Kultus, Jugend und Sport 
Baden- Württemberg, Pressemitteilung Nr. 119/98, 13 
July 1998.
26.  See Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart,  “Tragen 
eines Kopftuchs im Unterricht durch Lehrerin. Urt. v. 
24.3.2000 — 15 K 532/99” (“The Wearing of a Head-
scarf by a Teacher in the Classroom. Decision of 24 
March 2000”), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 
19 (2000): 959 – 61; Verwaltungsgerichthof Mann-
heim, “Religiös motiviertes Tragen eines Kopftuchs 
als Eignungskriterium für Lehramtsbewerberin. Urt. 
v. 26.6.2001 — 4 S 1439/00” (“Religiously Motivated 
Wearing of a Headscarf as Criteria for Suitability for 
Employment for a Teacher Applicant”), Neue Juristi-
sche Wochenschrift 54, no. 39 (2001): 2899 – 2905.
27. Verwaltungsgerichthof Mannheim, “Religiös mo-
tiviertes Tragen eines Kopftuchs.”
28. Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfG), 2 BvR 1436/ 
02 vom 3.6.2003, 24 September 2003.
29.  Ibid. 
30.  The eight provinces that ban the headscarf are 
Baden- Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hes-
sen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine – Westphalia, and 
Saarland. Claudia Breger, “Religious Turns: Immigra-
tion, Islam, and Christianity in Twenty- ﬁrst Century 
German Cultural Politics,” Konturen 1, no. 1 (2008), 
konturen.uoregon.edu/vol1_Breger.html#.
31.  “Landtag von Baden- Württemberg 13. Wahlperi-
ode. Drucksache 13/3091,” 14 April 2004.
32.  Thomas Gasparini, “Die Kopftuch- Gesetze der 
Bundesländer” (“The Headscarf Laws of the Provin-
ces”) Welt Online, 29 August 2004, www.welt.de 
/print- wams/article115090/Die_Kopftuch_Gesetze 
_der_Bundeslaender.html.
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Ludin at this point chose to end her battle in 
the courts rather than pursue her case back to 
the Federal Constitutional Court. There was 
discussion about the European Commission 
reviewing these laws for adherence to EU anti-
discrimination guidelines, but this has not been 
pursued. This may be because French, Turkish, 
and Swiss headscarf bans have been declared 
acceptable by the European Court of Human 
Rights (a judicial institution linked to the Coun-
cil of Europe, not the EU); the assumption is 
that given these precedents in the European 
Court of Human Rights, the commission would 
not find dierently.33
The Headscarf as a Marker against Secularism
As evidenced by the language of the Baden-
Württemberg ban, the discussions surrounding 
this case have constructed Christianity and the 
West as per se supportive of freedoms and the 
liberal democratic order. Their relationship to 
secularism, then, does not need to be exam-
ined. By definition, they support secularism 
(and as I discuss below, European tolerance). 
Throughout the Ludin case, the covering or re-
vealing of her body became the marker of her 
ability to participate in a modern, Enlightened 
German or European society, defined by its val-
ues of secularism and tolerance. The content 
of these relationships is deeply contradictory. 
While Ludin was initially challenged for not 
being Christian, she was later perceived to be 
unable to fulfill her duties because she was in-
adequately secular. Both positions construct the 
Muslim woman as inherently unable to emerge 
into a position as subject of the German state, 
unable to participate in European democracy. 
The shifting and contradictory meanings of the 
headscarf converge, however, in their exclusion 
of women of immigrant heritage from cultural, 
economic, and political citizenship. A certain 
consistency emerges primarily in terms of the 
regulation of otherness in order to manage a 
Europe constructed as secular norm. This is 
particularly apparent in the dissenting opinion 
in the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision, 
which argues that the headscarf potentially en-
dangers the “religious peace in society.” 34 Thus 
the headscarved woman not only is unable to 
emerge as a European subject but also serves as 
the marker of a threat to foundational notions of 
that subject. The dierential laws that emerged 
following this case suggest in fact that Christian-
ity is being privileged as a tradition informing 
the secular German state. However, exclusion is 
founded not by any action of Ludin’s but rather 
by the possible interpretations of her headscarf 
in the future. This becomes a sort of phobia, as 
Claudia Breger points out, of the uncontrollable 
resignification of the headscarf.35
The “Conflict of Cultures”:  
Secularism as Battle between Tolerance  
and Condemnation of Violence against Women
In the press, courts, and legal scholarship, secu-
larism discussions are often framed as a “con-
flict of cultures” that reveals the “true danger” 
of Islam in Europe, and one that occurs because 
immigrants do not arrive from “secular coun-
tries” — Germany is suering from “foreign re-
ligiosity.” 36 In the context of the headscarf de-
bate, the notion of the clash of cultures became 
a debate about tolerance with two streams: what 
decision would demonstrate “European tol-
erance” vis- à- vis an intolerant Islam and how 
much tolerance was too much. One can see this 
in particular as courts seek to legitimate the ex-
istence of crucifixes in the schools while simul-
33.  For a more complete overview, see Weber, “Cloth 
on Her Head.”
34. BverfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 vom 3.6.2003, par. 99.
35. See Breger, “Religious Turns,” 23.
36.  Johann Bader, “Darf eine muslimische Lehrerin 
in der Schule ein Kopftuch tragen?” (“Can a Mus-
lim Teacher Be Permitted to Wear a Headscarf in the 
School?”), Verwaltungsblätter für Baden- Württemberg
19, no. 10 (1998): 365; Ulf Häußler, “Religion und Inte-
gration,” Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländer-
politik 19, no. 1 (1999): 36; Helmut Kerscher, “Ein Stück 
Stoff und seine Folgen” (“A Piece of Cloth and Its Con-
sequences”), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 June 2003, sec. 
Themen des Tages; Michael Bertrams, “Lehrerin mit 
Kopftuch? Islamismus und Menschenrecht” (“Teacher 
with Headscarf? Islamism and Human Rights”), Deut-
sches Verwaltungsblatt, no. 19 (2003): 1225 – 34; Bun-
desverwaltungsgericht, “Die Einstellung als Lehrerin 
an Grund- und Hauptschulen im Beamtenverhältnis 
auf Probe” (“The Appointment of a Teacher to Elemen-
tary and High Schools as a Civil Servant in Training”), 
Juristen Zeitung 58, no. 5 (2003): 254; Helmut Goerlich, 
“Distanz und Neutralität im Lehrberuf — zum Kopf-
tuch und anderen religiösen Symbolen” (“Distance 
and Neutrality in the Teaching Career — On the Heads-
carf and Other Religious Symbols”) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift, no. 40 (1999): 2929 – 33; Martin Mor-
lok and Julian Krüper, “Auf dem Weg zum ‘forum neu-
trum’? — Die ‘Kopftuch- Entscheidung’ des BverwG” 
(“On the Way to a ‘Forum Neutrum’? The Headscarf 
Decision of the Federal Administrative Court”), Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 56 (2003): 1020 – 21; and 
Burkhard Schöbener, “Die ‘Lehrerin mit dem Kopf-
tuch’ — europäisch gewendet!” (“The ‘Teacher with 
the Head scarf’ — Turned toward Europe!”), Juristische 
Ausbildung, no. 3 (2001): 186.
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taneously denying Muslim symbols: “Children 
associate little with the mere everyday object on 
the wall, which demonstrates no immediate re-
lationship to a concrete person or to facts of life 
[Lebenssachverhalt ]. The crucifix is so much — be-
yond its religious meaning — a general cultural 
symbol for a culture which is rooted firmly in 
values drawn from Jewish and Christian sources, 
yet is open and has become tolerant through 
rich but also tragic [leidvoll] historical experi-
ence.” 37 This explanation of the crucifix is typi-
cal of a larger tendency to assume that Christi-
anity (sometimes expressed as Judeo- Christian 
culture) inherently is more capable of being 
tolerant than Islam is, although this citation is 
unique in its pointing to fascism as a cause of 
that tolerance. Ludin embodies the cultural op-
posite of emancipation because the headscarf 
reveals Islam’s tendency toward violence, as well 
as cultural exclusion, while tolerance becomes 
exclusively Christian: “Tolerance of those who 
think dierently is a particular cultural marker 
of Christianity.” 38 The converse is also true: per-
mitting the headscarf would merely evidence 
Christian tolerance: “Shouldn’t this headscarf, 
the symbol of a supposedly repressive religion, 
be banned in the name of progress? Or wouldn’t 
it be precisely an exemplary sign of Western tol-
erance to permit the headscarf ?” 39
Ludin’s insistent self- representation, and 
her desire to claim rights as a citizen in Ger-
man democracy through recourse to the con-
stitutional court, is obscured by the emphasis 
on cultural clash framed as conflict between 
a peaceful, tolerant state and the violence of 
Islam. The violence of Islam against women, it is 
perceived, will rise if headscarves increase their 
presence in the German public. This location of 
violence within the Muslim family functions in a 
twofold way: to limit the emergence of the Mus-
lim subject to the public sphere via relocation to 
the private sphere of the family and to obscure 
the forms of racism that may be preventing the 
emergence of the immigrant woman as political 
subject.
Feminist responses have been particularly 
contentious. In the case of Ludin, responses 
were dominated by Alice Schwarzer, a main-
stream feminist who even today continues to be 
the public face of German feminism — to the 
frustration of many feminists, however — and by 
women of Muslim heritage who reject Islam and 
argue that Islam is fundamentally incompatible 
with women’s rights. The feminist responses re-
ceiving the most attention belie research that 
suggests that many women who choose the 
headscarf also insist on women’s autonomy in 
work, education, and relationships.40 While the 
only mainstream feminist publication, EMMA, 
founded by and still largely inf luenced by 
Schwarzer, most recently has begun to include 
stories providing perspectives complicating the 
role of the headscarf in German culture, such 
feminist responses continue to be dominated 
by perspectives arguing that opposing the 
headscarf ban is a sign of either “too much” or 
“naive” tolerance, while the headscarf is per se 
a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism.41
The Murder of Marwa el- Sherbini
When el- Sherbini was murdered in a German 
courtroom, she had just completed her testi-
mony against the right- wing NPD sympathizer 
Wiens, who had appealed his fine for insulting 
speech against el- Sherbini, having called her a 
terrorist and Islamist. In the courtroom, Wiens 
37. BverfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 vom 3.6.2003, par. 113.
38. Dieter Bednarz, “Allah- Mania,” Spiegel Special, 
no. 1 (1998): 112. On Islam’s tendency toward vio-
lence, see Wulf Reimer, “Kopftuchstreit in Plüder-
hausen: Eine muslimische Pädagogin verwirrt Baden-
Württemberg” (“Headscarf Debate in Plüderhausen: 
A Muslim Teacher Confuses Baden- Württemberg”), 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 July 1998, sec. Nachrichten; 
Brigitte- Johanna Henkel- Waidhofer, “‘Man könnte 
meinen, die Türken stehen wieder vor Wien’: Hitzige 
Debatte im Südwesten über Lehrerin mit Kopftuch; 
Landesregierung muss entscheiden” (“One Would 
Think That the Turks Are at the Gates of Vienna Once 
Again: Heated Debate in the Southwest about a 
Teacher with a Headscarf; The Provincial Parliament 
Must Decide”), AP German Worldstream (Stuttgart), 
8 July 1998; and Alfred Behr, “Muslimin beschäftigt 
den Stuttgarter Landtag” (“Stuttgart Parliament 
Concerned with Muslim Woman”), Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, 11 July 1998, sec. Politik. On Islam’s 
tendency toward cultural exclusion, see Brigitte J. 
Waidhofer, “Lehrerin mit Kopftuch” (“Teacher with 
Headscarf”), AP German Worldstream, 13 July 1998. 
39. Bednarz, “Allah- Mania,” 112.
40.  See Sigrid Nökel, Die Töchter der Gastarbeiter 
und der Islam: Zur Soziologie alltagsweltlicher Aner-
kennungspolitiken; eine Fallstudie (Daughters of the 
Guestworkers and of Islam: Toward the Sociology of 
Everyday Politics of Recognition: A Case Study) (Biele-
feld, Germany: Transcript, 2002).
41. On the role of the headscarf in German culture, 
see Lamya Kaddor, “Wäre Gott heute für das Kopf-
tuch?” (“Would God Be for the Headscarf Today?”), 
EMMA, September – October 2009. On the headscarf 
as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism, see Elisa-
beth Badinter, “Das Kopftuch ist ein Symbol” (“The 
Headscarf is a Symbol”), EMMA, September – October 
2009; and Alice Schwarzer, “Kein Kopftuch in der 
Schule!” (“No Headscarf in the School!”), EMMA, 
September – October 2009.
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continued his racist speech, declaring that Mus-
lims and non- Europeans had no right to be in 
Europe. El- Sherbini’s story challenges the nar-
ratives about Muslim women in several ways. 
When Muslim women seek to wear the head-
scarf while working as public school teachers, 
the headscarf is seen as evidence that Muslim 
women are victims of Muslim patriarchy and 
pawns of Islamist movements. Yet like Ludin, el-
Sherbini was a self- assured woman claiming her 
rights under German law in the German court 
system — even though not a citizen. Her death 
was not at the hands of a family member — in-
deed, her husband was shot by a policeman who 
entered the courtroom after the stabbing and 
assumed the husband was the perpetrator. The 
discourse at home and abroad largely trans-
formed her from an active participant in the 
democratic process to a hijab martyr. 
The German Central Council of Jews as 
well as the German Central Council of Mus-
lims both gave public statements condemning 
the crime, but federal and local ocials were 
slow to react publicly to the murder. Wiens was 
convicted of murder. All court officials were 
cleared of any wrongdoing in the shooting of 
el- Sherbini’s husband. In 2010 the media re-
searcher Sabine Schier was charged with slan-
der and fined €6,000 or two months’ imprison-
ment because she stated in an interview that the 
mistaken shooting of the victim’s husband by 
a police ocer must be examined for possible 
racist connections (upon appeal, these charges 
were dropped).
Though the headscarf was not specifically 
mentioned in the complaint against Wiens, the 
fact that el- Sherbini wore a hijab was perceived 
to be provocation for both the verbal attack and 
the murder. Her murder was seen internation-
ally as indicative of a growing German and Eu-
ropean Islamophobia.42 Also widely reported 
were the contradictory reactions of el- Sherbini’s 
family: the father calling for an end to all forms 
of hate, the brother swearing vengeance.43 As 
this reaction widened to the US and the British 
press, increasing pressure was put on German 
media and government ocials to respond to 
the crime; seven days after the murder, stories 
began appearing. These stories drew connec-
tions from el-  Sherbini’s murder to the Mu-
hammad cartoons that appeared in Denmark 
in 2006 — not, however, to the case of Ludin. 
Those connections already suggest a German 
imagination of a chaotic “overreaction” on the 
part of the Muslim world, as responses to the 
cartoon controversy were often portrayed.
Racist Germany?
When the media and government ocials began 
to respond, it was often to point out why this case 
does not indicate German racism. One Dresden 
ocial even claimed that clearly Dresden was 
not racist, since he himself had a Korean wife.44
The charges brought against media researcher 
Schier in 2010 for suggesting that racism might 
have led to the shooting of el- Sherbini’s hus-
band show the fear of naming racism as existing 
outside of the action of individuals, as poten-
tially even present in German institutions, even 
as they also function to prosecute hate speech. 
When the crime is labeled xenophobic, racist, 
or Islamophobic in motivation, the crime is seen 
as a rare crime committed by a fanatic individu-
al.45 Potential violence, however, threatens from 
without in the imagination of masses of Muslim 
protestors who were pictured in the news cover-
age that did exist.
In many cases the media emphasized that 
Wiens was a so- called Russlanddeutscher — a Rus-
sian of German heritage. Because of Germany’s 
42. See “Murder of Egyptian Woman and Islamopho-
bia,” Korea Times, 19 July 2009; Kate Connolly and Jack 
Shenker, “Racism Row: The Headscarf Martyr; Mur-
der in German Court Sparks Egyptian Fury at West’s 
‘Islamophobia,’” Guardian, 8 July 2009, final edi-
tion; Alaa Al Aswany, “Egyptian Author on Murdered 
Muslim Woman: ‘The Reaction of the German Gov-
ernment Was Not Fair,’” by Volkhard Windfuhr and 
Bernhard Zand, Spiegel Online, 20 July 2009, www 
.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,637805,00 
.html; “Afghan Daily Condemns Silence over Action 
against Uighurs in China,” BBC Monitoring Trans Cau-
casus Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
12 July 2009; Birgit Cerha, “Die Wut Ägyptens; Isla-
mische Welt über Bluttat entsetzt” (“Egypt’s Anger; 
Islamic World Horriﬁed by Bloody Murder”), Frank-
furter Rundschau, 13 July 2009; “Egyptian Fury at 
Dresden Murder: Protestors Accuse Germany of Rac-
ism,” Spiegel Online, 7 July 2009, www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,634842,00.html; “Irani-
ans Protest Killing of Veiled Egyptian Woman in Ger-
many,” BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit Supplied 
by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 July 2009; and Alaa 
Al Aswany, “Western Hostility to Islam Is Stoked by 
Double Standards and Distortion,” Guardian, 21 July 
2009, ﬁnal edition, sec. Comment and Debate.
43. See Cerha, “Die Wut Ägyptens.”
44.  See Wolf Schmidt, “Vorwärts und vergessen?” 
(“Forward and Forget?”) Taz, Die Tageszeitung, 24 
July 2009.
45. See Andrea Dernbach, “Weiße Rosen für Marwa” 
(“White Roses for Marwa”), Der Tagesspiegel, 12 July 
2009, sec. Politik.
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historic policies of privileging “blood” in im-
migration to Germany, Russians of German 
heritage were considered desirable immigrants 
until recently and thus were given relatively 
easy access to citizenship. In the initial stories 
about el- Sherbini, there was an anticipation of 
a discovery that Wiens’s Islamophobia had been 
“pre- programmed” during his time in Russia.46 
Repeatedly, comments asserted that Germany is 
not Islamophobic and that Wiens’s emigration 
from Russia contradicts accusations of a Ger-
man Islamophobia: “What does this uprooted 
man have to do with us Germans?” 47 Indeed, the 
murder supposedly tells us “as much about the 
dominant Islamophobia in Russia as about xe-
nophobia in Germany.” 48 One of the few stories 
to actually take on the impacts of this murder 
for debates on multiculturalism in Germany, 
published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, drew paral-
lels to the 1992 Los Angeles riots and suggested 
that el- Sherbini’s murder was the consequence 
of conflict between two “niche cultures.” 49 This 
desire to locate the roots of violence outside of 
“German” culture is reinforced by an absence. 
The Russlanddeutscher, once understood as “Ger-
man” enough to be a more desirable immigrant, 
now is conveniently “not German.” Wiens is un-
problematically referred to as a Russlanddeutscher 
now to emphasize his dierence from German-
ness. This can cover up the racialized under-
standings of Germanness that led to a notion of 
the Russlanddeutscher in the first place.50
Certainly, in this case it is important to 
acknowledge where the German legal system 
was working against racist speech. This suggests 
that a German secularism has emerged in which 
a subject might be marked by dierence and yet 
be able to claim some rights under German law. 
The functioning of the legal system in the regu-
lation of hate speech, however, does not serve as 
evidence that racism or Islamophobia is absent. 
When one considers el- Sherbini’s murder and 
the responses to it in comparison to the ongoing 
and extensive discussions about the headscarf 
debates, it becomes obvious that the focus on 
the headscarf can indeed function to obscure 
forces of discrimination in German society.
Feminists in Germany have further been 
slow to consider el- Sherbini’s murder as a prob-
lem relevant to feminist analysis. This response 
is partially due to a thorny problem facing 
analyses of violence against women. How can 
one challenge the representations of Islam as 
inherently violent, of Muslim men as inherently 
violent, and also challenge the violence against 
Muslim women that does exist? Western femi-
nists have largely failed to find an alternative 
way to talk about violence that would allow for 
productive engagement with Islam. And those 
who seek to take on these dicult questions are 
largely ignored by the German government as 
well as by the mainstream media, which instead 
consistently turn to a very few voices who insist 
on total rejection of Islam.
The media coverage of el- Sherbini’s death 
reveals issues that would seem to call for a femi-
nist response. For example, most initial press 
coverage states that Wiens also called el- Sherbini 
an Islamist whore. According to Steen Winter, 
who was a rare journalist to actually examine 
el- Sherbini’s complaint and testimony, she de-
nied this claim.51 She brought her complaint to 
reject her positioning within German society as 
a terrorist and Islamist. While she may have at-
tempted to depoliticize the headscarf, and deg-
ender her claims to human rights, the repeated 
circulation of a notion of an “Islamist whore” 
suggests the power that the sexualization of the 
Muslim woman’s body continues to have in Ger-
man discussions of integration.
46. Hannes Heine, “Am Start für den Staat Opfer 
der Hetze: Die offenbar rassistische Messerattacke 
auf eine Ägypterin im Landgericht Dresden wird zu-
nehmend zu einem Politikum; Warum ist die Tat so 
brisant?” (“At the Start for the State, Victims of In-
flammatory Speech: The Apparently Racist Stabbing 
of an Egyptian in the Provincial Court of Dresden are 
Increasingly Becoming Political; Why is The Crime So 
Controversial?”), Der Tagesspiegel, 9 July 2009, sec. 
Zweite.
47.  Sibylle Krause- Burger, “Ein Unbehauster in sei-
nem dumpfen Drang” (“A Man without a Home, His 
Listless Urge”), Stuttgarter Zeitung, 15 July 2009.
48. Tomas Avenarius, “Empörung in Alexandria: Pro-
teste nach Mord an Ägypterin in deutschem Gerichts-
saal” (“Outrage in Alexandria: Protests after the Mur-
der of an Egyptian Woman in a German Courtroom”) 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 July 2009, sec. Panorama.
49. Andrian Kreye, “Kampf der fremden Kulturen: 
Die Multikulturalismus- Frage im Messermord von 
Dresden” (“Battle of Foreign Cultures: The Question 
of Multiculturalism in the Dresden Stabbing”), Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, 14 July 2009.
50. While I cannot address this in detail here, it is in-
teresting to note that Swiss newspapers expressed 
outrage that el- Sherbini’s case was receiving so much 
more interest than violent attacks by youth against 
Swiss tourists in Munich were given. See “Bluttat mit 
internationalen Konsequenzen: Ein Mord in Dresden 
erregt Empörung in der muslimischen Welt” (“Bloody 
Deed with International Consequences: A Murder in 
Dresden Causes Outrage in the Muslim World”), Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 14 July 2009. 
51. See Steffen Winter, “Justiz: ‘Bloßer Hass,’” (“Justice: 
Simple Hate”), Spiegel Online, 31 August 2009, www 
.spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,646122,00.html.
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While accusations of Islamophobia or rac-
ism are firmly rebued, the state is willing to 
entertain the possibility that security may be lax 
in German courtrooms.52 An investigation was 
opened into the possibility that the presiding 
judge inadequately provided for el- Sherbini’s 
security in the courtroom, though no charges 
were brought. Necla Kelek, an outspoken pro-
ponent for a headscarf ban, sees el- Sherbini 
as doubly victimized: by the headscarf, which 
she argues is necessarily oppressive to women, 
and by the court’s inability to protect.53 The 
discourse of security removes el- Sherbini from 
her active participation in German democracy 
through claiming antidiscrimination protection 
and testifying at the trial. Instead, el- Sherbini is 
located as the recipient of physical protection 
at the hands of the court, as paternalistic repre-
sentative of the state.
Reconfiguring the Public Sphere?
One must, however, consider the ways that dis-
cussions in the wake of el- Sherbini’s murder 
may be functioning to reconfigure the public 
sphere. While it was an argument rarely at-
tended to in the press, Stephan J. Kramer, the 
general secretary of the Central Council of 
Jews, responded early to the murder by arguing 
that attacks based on race, religion, or nation-
ality are fundamentally attacks on democracy 
itself. Kramer’s remarks evoke the potential for 
a secular democracy that does not regulate dif-
ference through a condescending tolerance. In-
stead Kramer seeks to respond to the “largely 
unchecked hate propaganda against Muslims 
spread by everyone from marginal extremists 
right through to people at the centre of society” 
with the hard work of respect.54
Journalist Hilal Sezgin also seeks to rec-
ognize and name racism in her contributions 
to the online version of a popular Berlin daily 
newspaper, the Tageszeitung. She counters the 
claim that accusations of Islamophobia or dis-
crimination against Muslims are merely appro-
priations of el- Sherbini’s death by Egypt and 
Iran.55 Sezgin evades the reduction of racism to 
an individual act, reminding the public that a 
racist act gains its significance in a specific con-
text. She also criticizes the many voices who have 
argued that if any country knows how to be self-
 critical when it comes to racism and violence, 
it is Germany. Germany will demonstrate such 
maturity, she contends, not by being insulted by 
claims of discrimination but by being disturbed 
enough to investigate whether such claims are 
true. She argues,
The growth in Islamophobia in Germany means, 
for example, that a pattern has been established 
in our public speech that evokes specific images 
(veiled women, scenes of masses of raised be-
hinds in prayer), ignores some questions (“Why 
doesn’t Islam possess the same legal rights as the 
Churches?”), and privileges others (“Why have 
they still not learned any German?). This pat-
tern classifies members of a population group 
through stereotypes, and allows the individuals 
to appear more as performing mouthpieces of 
their supposed “culture” than as individual ac-
tors with their own preferences and decisions.56 
Sezgin’s discussion suggests that Islamophobia 
functions specifically through the regulatory 
practices of secularism. These reduce represen-
tations of individuals to their association with 
Islam, while ignoring the structural privileging 
of Christianity — for example, through contracts 
with the state.
Andreas Fanizadeh, also in the Tageszei-
tung, criticizes the inability to name and con-
front racism from a dierent perspective. He 
emphasizes that the reduction of this act to a 
question of Left versus Right also prevents ev-
eryday Germans from working to prevent rac-
ism.57 He further argues that while laws have 
improved for minorities living in Germany, 
who are discovering more trust in German civil 
society, these improvements have come at the 
cost of increasing attempts to cut off further 
immigration.
52. See “Bluttat mit internationalen Konsequenzen.”
53.  See Necla Kelek, “Verstoß gegen die Menschen-
würde” (“A Violation of Human Dignity”), EMMA, 
September – October 2009, 98 – 99, www.emma.de/
ressorts/artikel/kopftuch- burka/verstoss- gegen 
- die- menschenwuerde/.
54.  Stephan J. Kramer, “In Solidarity with All Mus-
lims,” Qantara.de, 13 July 2009, www.qantara.de/
webcom/show_article.php/_c- 476/_nr- 1187/i.html.
55.  See Hilal Sezgin, “Das reine deutsche Gewissen” 
(“The Pure German Conscience”), Taz.de, 22 July 2009, 
www.taz.de/1/debatte/kolumnen/artikel/1/das- reine 
- deutsche- gewissen/.
56.  Ibid.
57.  See Andreas Fanizadeh, “Aufstand der Anständi-
gen?” (“Revolt of the Respectable?”), Taz, Die Tages-
zeitung, 18 July 2009, sec. Meinung und Diskussion.
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Headscarves, Violence, and the  
Potential for Critique
The relative inattention to the el- Sherbini case is 
indicative of the eectiveness of the discourses 
that were created during the headscarf debates. 
The headscarf can trigger an already existing 
set of discursive regimes that assumes the total-
ity of a successful tolerant secularism that con-
structs a nonviolent European heritage. The ref-
erence to the headscarf activates a tradition that 
has located the origins of violence — primarily 
as gendered violence — so firmly elsewhere that 
Germany is successfully able to evade a discus-
sion of forms of racialized violence within its 
own borders.
The power of this discourse challenges the 
potential for critique within critical theory. As I 
outlined earlier, the notion of critique emerges 
from a tradition that specifically links critique 
to a secular position. Criticism might be seen as 
directed at an object or phenomenon, while cri-
tique is directed at the conditions under which 
an object or phenomenon can come into being; 
the existence of that very distinction, however, 
has long been associated with the critique of re-
ligion itself. How, then, to turn critique against 
itself — to direct critique at the very notion of 
secularism as it is raised by debates on head-
scarves and veils? In a dierent context, Judith 
Butler sees one possibility in the work of Wal-
ter Benjamin, in that he continually points to 
an interruption in the narrative of Enlighten-
ment progress that occurs when the premodern 
erupts into the modern.58 Alternatively, Butler 
suggests, one might turn to the work of Michel 
Foucault, who conceptualized critique as an at-
titude outside of a Kantian regime of reason 
and saw it both as a challenge to the evaluative 
frameworks within which criticism occurs and 
as an interrogation of the conditions under 
which the subject emerges.59 My analysis im-
plies similar questions: under what conditions 
does the headscarf come to signify the violence 
and danger of Islam? What frameworks enable 
the public criticism of the headscarf ? What are 
the conditions for the coming- into- being of the 
secular subject, the subject who can act as agent 
in the public sphere? The cases of Ludin and el-
 Sherbini point to the need for a critical project 
that interrogates secularism itself as the frame-
work within which the headscarf is judged.
A juxtaposition of the discussions of the 
Ludin and el- Sherbini cases reveals much about 
these questions. While Ludin’s case can be used 
to illustrate the supposed arrival of a threaten-
ing Islam into the heart of Europe’s democratic 
institutions, el- Sherbini’s murder in a German 
courtroom is used both to discursively expel the 
roots of violence from Europe (by locating sys-
temic violence in Russia and Egypt, while rep-
resenting el- Sherbini’s murder as an isolated 
incident) and to legitimate increased emphasis 
on security.
These two women both sought active par-
ticipation in public debate and temporarily ne-
gotiated a position in a secular public sphere — 
not only with the headscarf but because of it. 
Yet the headscarf ultimately leads to their ex-
pulsion from the public sphere. This occurs 
metaphorically in the case of el- Sherbini, when 
public memory marks her as victim but excludes 
her as agent in a democratic process. Ludin’s ex-
pulsion is not only from the public sphere but 
from a special public space, when she is denied 
a position as a public teacher. The headscarf 
thus occupies an ambivalent function: it serves 
as the means by which these women emerge 
into public space, but ultimately, it also acts as 
the marker of cultural otherness that prohib-
its their participation in a democratic public 
sphere. The subject of democracy remains ab-
stracted and unmarked but firmly “European.” 
The field thus constituted can only partially 
represent the subject of democracy as wearing 
a hijab; she is quickly appropriated as the victim 
of external violence, or she disappears entirely.
The use of cultural dierence to obscure 
the question of racist violence evokes the tra-
dition of legitimizing violence against peoples 
of color in colonialist discourses through the 
reference to a backwardness that must be “en-
lightened” through European conquest.60 This 
58. See Judith Butler, “The Sensibility of Critique: Re-
sponse to Asad and Mahmood,” in Asad et al., Is Cri-
tique Secular?, 110 – 11.
59. See ibid., 112 – 14.
60. See Beverly M. Weber, “Freedom from Violence, 
Freedom to Make the World: Muslim Women’s Mem-
oirs, Gendered Violence, and Voices for Change in 
Germany,” in Women in German Yearbook 25 (2009): 
202 – 4; Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identi-
ties, Traditions, and Third- World Feminism (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 83 – 117; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of 
the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1999), 288 – 89; Cengiz Barskanmaz, 
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leads to another diculty for the potential for 
critique, when critiques of Islamophobia in 
turn themselves become associated with anti-
Enlightenment ideals. While this happens fre-
quently in public discussions of the headscarf, a 
particularly obvious example occurs in a leftist 
magazine for politics and culture, Konkret. An 
October 2009 issue illustrates a discussion be-
tween two journalists about the potential for a 
critique of Islam with a cover image of a woman 
whose face is completely covered by a niqab. One 
journalist, Kay Sokolowsky, takes the position 
that the critique of Islam, while necessary, has 
been appropriated by racists, while the other, 
Alex Feuerherdt, argues that Islam should be 
understood per se as a reactionary, antimod-
ern political ideology. Again, the veiled Muslim 
woman serves as the emblem for a debate about 
the relationship between Islam and modernity. 
She marks not only the limits of “tolerance” but 
also the limits of enlightened antiracism. Secu-
larism itself, alternatively, remains outside the 
possibility of critique, which in the logic of this 
discussion can only be directed at Islam itself.
The discursive exclusion of Muslim 
women from democratic participation is incom-
plete, however, and reveals ruptures that may 
have been forced precisely by the inability to 
engage with the racist violence that emerged 
in the face of el- Sherbini’s success in a battle 
against racist speech. Since el- Sherbini’s mur-
der, many women have expressed a new willing-
ness to acknowledge experiences of discrimi-
nation owing to the wearing of a headscarf.61 
Sezgin’s and Fanizadeh’s contributions to the 
discussion cited above, while evoking little re-
sponse, nevertheless emerged in a forum with 
fairly wide readership. They seek to consider 
an institutionalized racism that could exist out-
side of individual intent and consciousness and 
to place Wiens’s actions firmly in that context. 
These are all ways in which constructions of sec-
ularism, democracy, and religion will continue 
to be negotiated and renegotiated in the public 
sphere, as Muslims see themselves increasingly 
empowered to challenge Islamophobia in pub-
lic institutions.
An approach to European secularism 
that derives from the assumption of a Euro-
pean history that promotes peace, juxtaposed 
with a Muslim tradition that promotes violence, 
not only obscures Europe’s own history of co-
lonial and racist violence but actually prevents 
Muslim women from participating in the pub-
lic sphere. A vision of democratic modernity 
rooted in the exchange of ideas in the public 
sphere will always be thwarted so long as these 
blind spots in European history prevail. How-
ever, the headscarf discussions, read together, 
also reveal an alternative, reconfiguration of 
the public sphere. They point to the possibility 
for a critique of secularism that can function 
without the epistemic violence of constructing 
an other. This reconfigured sphere activates 
the desire for a utopian Europe that prioritizes 
human rights in the service of a revised secu-
larism. This revised secularism seeks to incor-
porate an understanding of dierence into the 
public sphere, beyond notions of tolerance, in 
order to reveal the structures of xenophobia, 
racism, or Islamophobia at work. Such a secu-
larism would imagine the elimination of racist 
violence as part of the larger goal of religious 
peace. Such a secularism also could imagine 
the headscarved teacher participating in a secu-
lar democratic public sphere and acknowledge 
xenophobic attacks as examples of existing rac-
ist violence. Only in this way could democratic 
structures be imagined that ban rather than 
regulate violence.
“Das Kopftuch als das Andere: Eine notwendige post-
koloniale Kritik des deutschen Rechtsdiskurses” (“The 
Headscarf as the Other: A Necessary Postcolonial 
Critique of the German Discourse of Justice”), in Der 
Stoff, aus dem Konflikte sind: Debatten um das Kopf-
tuch in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz (The 
Cloth of Which Conflicts are Made: Debates about the 
Headscarf in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), ed. 
Sabine Berghahn and Petra Rostock (Bielefeld, Ger-
many: Transcript, 2009), 362 – 64.
61.  See Kübra Yücel, “Seit dem Mord reden wir offe-
ner” (“Since the Murder, We Speak More Openly”), 
Taz.de, 31 July 2009, www.taz.de/1/politik/deutsch 
land/artikel/1/seit- dem- mord- reden- wir- offener/.
